HOW CAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOSTER PEACE THROUGH PARADIPLOMACY?
I – INTRODUCTION

The objective of this paper is to analyze how the emergence of subnational governments (ie. cities and state) as international actors (herefore referred as subnational governments engaging in paradiplomacy) can contribute to an enhanced regional and world security. In a second moment, we wish to show some case studies both proving and disproving our statement. Finally, we will try to identify some significant differences on the case studies that could point out to us which conditions are necessary to make it successful at enhancing security.

II – DEFINITIONS

According to Ivo Duchacek and Panayotis Soldatos, who drafted the first definition to the term, the concept of Paradiplomacy

“refers to direct international activity by sub-national actors (federated units, regions, urban communities, cities) supporting, complementing, correcting, duplicating or challenging the nation-states’ diplomacy.” (Soldatos, 1990:17).

In a latter literature, this time directly related to the security issue, Noe Cornago defines Paradiplomacy as

“non-central governments’ involvement in international relations through the establishment of permanent or ad hoc contacts with foreign public or private entities, with the aim to promote socioeconomic or cultural issues.

as well as any other foreign dimension of their constitutional competences” (Cornago, 1999:40)².

Apart from the concept of paradiplomacy, also the concept of protodiplomacy will be important to us. Protodiplomacy refers to “initiatives and activities of a non-central government abroad that graft a more or less separatist message on to its economic, social, and cultural links with foreign nations.”³ While paradiplomacy is considered a normal activity, depending on the degree of autonomy given to the subnational government, protodiplomacy is often seem as illegitimate or at least dangerous for the integrity of the state. The clear boundary between the two, however, can not be easily drawn. A paradiplomacy can be seen as a menace to the central government (vide the difficulties faced by French sub-national governments) and a protodiplomacy can start to be seen as a legitimate, democratic and rightful activity by the central government (such as Quebec’s relation with France)⁴.

Inasmuch we choose those definitions to be used in this article, it is worthwhile to mention that there are critics of those terminologies. Examples are Brian Hocking’s⁵ ‘multilayered diplomacy approach’⁶ and Der Derian⁷ assessment of the subject – labelled as a “‘neoclassical’ approach of this ‘post-modern’ International Relations ‘master in

⁶The approach is based on the communication channels accessed by the non-central governments to influence foreign policy within the nation-state.
"the making"⁸ by Inaki Aguirre⁹, who also opposes the term and provide a nice state-of-the-art analysis on the epistemological aspect of the issue.

Despite the critics, this article utilizes both concepts into the reasoning of our hypothesis and conclusions.

III – PARADIPLOMACY AND SECURITY

Noe Cornago¹⁰ categorized the ways that a paradiplomacy can influence international security in the following three ways: first as an instrument for the reduction of the transnational dimensions of ethnic conflict; second as a way to promote confidence and regional security; and finally as an effective way for dealing with transnational menaces to security.

When Cornago mentions paradiplomacy as a tool for dealing with transnational ethnic conflict, he is strictly thinking on an approach based on the grant of autonomy to a constituent member of a federation in order to defuse separatist ambitions based on the desire for more self government rights. He sustains that

"it is becoming widely accepted that the exercise of self-determination does not necessarily lead to the obtaining of full state sovereignty, and that the demands that justify it can often be satisfied by the recognition of cultural and self-government rights" (Cornago, 1999:43)¹¹.

While stressing that this conclusion came from empirical evidence (he does highlight some examples on his article, notably about Europe, China and Russia) in situations

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⁹Idem, pp. 185-209.
¹¹Idem, Noe Cornago, 1999, pp. 43.
where war scenarios are not credible and in the presence “of determined conditions of institutional stability”\textsuperscript{12}, he also acknowledge that, although increasingly used as a tool by the nation-states, the results are ‘more or less’ successful.

In fact, Cornago is very clear at disclaiming any conclusion about whether this policy is bearing any positive results:

\begin{quote}
“We are not suggesting that the development of a certain tolerance towards minority cross-border or international contacts constitutes a solution to ethnic conflicts, which had until now passed unnoticed. We can claim, more modestly that ethnoterritorial policy and management of ethnic conflicts is beginning to take into account, in the most disparate of contexts, the transnational dimensions and, consequently, the value of different forms of paradiplomacy as political instruments to be used, in one form or another, in the administration of these problems…” (Cornago, 1999: 46)\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

Taking for granted the results of his research that point out the fact that this kind of strategy is being adopted with a certain frequency, a new question arises: What are the conditions that contributes to a ‘more’, instead of ‘less’, successful result for the policy?

Although it is difficult to draw any conclusive answer without an empirical test, and those are proven to be very hard to infer due to the heterogeneity of the local governments\textsuperscript{14}, some case-studies may suggest the existence of common pre-conditions for a more ‘smooth’, if not termed ‘successful’, adoption of this ethnoterritorial policy.

First, it seems intuitively obvious that this kind of arrangement can be used only as a prevention rather than a remedy for violence. If violence has already taken place, it is very unlikely that the central government will grant any kind of concession as this may be perceived as a first step for separation. Likewise, both central and non central

\begin{footnotes}
\item[12]Idem, Noe Cornago, 1999, pp. 42.
\end{footnotes}
government, although maybe culturally and ethnically different, must have the shared perception of ‘wanting to be together’ and of ‘being better together than alone’. If this is not so, there will be a constant pressure for independence from the local government side and a constant mistrust from the central government. Finally, in order to reduce tensions after the granting of autonomy on foreign affairs, institutions for coordinated action and channels of communications must be created, as well as clear defined competencies on what is ‘allowed’ and what is ‘not allowed’.

For the two first assertions, it is enough to remember that Russia allowed Tatarstan to develop its own international relations in certain fields through a 1994 bilateral agreement. The same model was then applied in Chechenia, aiming at ending the war. The arrangement with Tatarstan was successful but with Chechenia, although it did halt the war at a first moment, was not enough to bring a definite settlement for the conflict.15

Concerning the last assertion, that of possible shocking brought from colliding foreign policy, and the need of coordinating mechanisms and clear competencies, our example also comes from Russia. In 1997, representatives from the Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Sakha (Yakutia), Tatarstan, Tuva, Khakassia and Chuvash Republics participated in the “meeting of friendship, brotherhood and cooperation of the Turkish states and communities” in Istanbul. At the meeting, those russian non-central governments signed a document calling for the granting of international recognition to the Turkish part of Cyprus. This caused intense embarrassment for Russia as the official position, asserted in UN Security Council resolutions, is that Russia rejects the international recognition of Northern Cyprus.16

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Analyzing closer the second way on which Cornago identifies paradiplomacy as possibly contributing to peace, that is to say, as a way to promote confidence and regional security, Cornago himself deemed it as “*one of the most important*” although it is also limited in scope. It refers to the creation of cooperative linkages between different localities, generating trust and friendship among the people. Some related activities are the twinning of towns and regions (used after the II War as a channel for reconciliation), cultural and technical exchanges of people (many times carried out by the sister-cities), intensification of cross-border commerce, promotion of tourism, etc. All of those favor people to people contact (P2P) and generate an environment prone for peace and cooperation, like in South East Asia, in which Laos and Thailand improved diplomatic relations due to cross-border incentive for P2P contacts.

The concept of P2P, although already explored by Immanuel Kant on the “*Third Definite Article for a Perpetual Peace – The Law of World Citizenship Shall be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality*”¹⁹, was adopted with success after the II World War in Europe. The objective was to bring reconciliation among the people and end all kinds of mistrust between them. That was the case of the Rotary Foundation (“*...offers activities designed to... advance the organization’s ultimate goal of world understanding and peace*”²⁰), AIESEC (“*what began in 1948 as an organisation to help develop “friendly relations” between member countries is now a global association with activities in 89 different countries and territories.*”²¹), and IAESTE ( “*...was founded in 1948... in a post war effort to promote better understanding between countries and cultures*”²²). All of the above mentioned institutions try to foster peace in the world.

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¹⁷ Idem, Noe Cornago, 1999, pp. 46.
¹⁹ Immanuel Kant, 1795, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”
²⁰ Rotary International – History
²¹ AIESEC – History
²² IAESTE – Association for the Exchange of Students for Technical Experience – History
http://www.iaeste.org/about/history.html (accessed 05 January, 2006)
through an enhanced contact between people from different national and cultural backgrounds. The underlined mechanism believed to be in force here is that, after experiencing a different culture in a peaceful and non-hostile environment, people will realize that a common understanding can emerge from diversity, putting down their differences and prejudices against each other.

Also within that category are the “twinning” arrangements among cities, one sponsoring institution being the ‘Sister Cities International’, with the stated mission of “promote peace through mutual respect, understanding and cooperation – one individual, one community at a time”23. The activities of sister-cities many times include P2P, but also cultural, educational, technical and commercial projects, all of which contributes to peace building. In the case of ‘Sister Cities International’, the focus is directly in peace building (“promotes peace through mutual respect, understanding and cooperation by focusing on sustainable development... humanitarian assistance and economic growth programs”24). Being an institution based on the United States of America, the latest projects have focused on developing goodwill connections with cities from islamic countries.

This approach based on P2P linkages apparently showed very successful results in the post-war Europe. It is, nevertheless, aimed at reconciliation. It does not work in situations when the conflict is ongoing or imminent. It is also a long term strategy, based on a constructivism approach and the change of perception of the common people. From an imaginary of mistrust, seeing the ‘other’ as enemy, people undergo a process of awareness and discovery that humanizes the ‘other’, in opposition to the previous stereotyped image.

Finally, the third way in which paradiplomacy can enhance security, according to Cornago, is through the so called transnational menaces in the international system.

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23 Sister Cities International – About Us
Those risks to human security do not respect borders and very often need collective action to be solved. Examples are terrorism, international organized crime, environmental or natural disasters, migrations, contraband, pollution, etc.

Cornago\textsuperscript{25} points out some examples related to the international protection of the environment to show how paradiplomacy can be effective:

\begin{quote}
“The lack of federal reaction to the effects of two consecutive oil slacks along the Pacific coast led the governments of British Columbia, Alaska, Washington, Oregon and California to create in 1988 a special unit or Task Force to bring together human, technical and financial resources to tackle the ecological disaster along their coasts.”
\end{quote}

Similarly,

\begin{quote}
“A similar cooperation has developed between New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Ontario and Quebec – due to the lack of interest on the part of the federal governments – to give impetus to the adoption of measures of control against acid rain and the general ecological deterioration of the Great lakes.”
\end{quote}

Of course, this kind of cooperation is dependent on the institutional capacity – either formal within the legal framework of the federation or material, related to the physical capacity to do what is agreed to be done – of the local government. Also, as it is a matter of collective action, trust that everyone will do its share of the agreement and not decide to be a “free-rider” is needed. This ‘trust’ often translates into a solid institutional framework and even into the existence of intervening institutions that can act as mediators, distributing sanctions and rewards according to each behavior.

\textsuperscript{24}Idem, Sister Cities International – About Us
\textsuperscript{25} Idem, Noe Cornago, 1999, pp. 50-53.
\textsuperscript{26} Idem, Noe Cornago, 1999, pp. 51
\textsuperscript{27}Idem, Noe Cornago, 1999, pp. 52.
Those requirements make developed countries in north-north cooperation or north-south cooperation more prone to happen. In the north-north cooperation, in comparison to a south-south cooperation, there is less uncertainty related to the physical capability to honor an agreement as the resources are more plentiful and usually public administrations are more stable and oriented for long-termed projects. In the case of north-south cooperation, the developed partner usually “subsides” the project, in an apparently philanthropic manner (which, because of the transnational nature of the modern treats, is often on the best interest of the developed partner as well).

Again, we bring one example from Russia for the north-south pattern of cooperation:

“As well as migration, ecological problems can make cross-border cooperation necessary. A number of Russian regions are confronted with cross-border ecological problems. The problem on the Barents Sea is particularly acute. Large scale nuclear pollution threatens this region, if the authorities do not quickly succeed in cleaning up the environment of the partly de-commissioned military installations, as well as the Russian navy’s deactivated nuclear submarines on the Kola peninsula. In particular, the bordering states of Finland and Norway are providing financial support and are trying to work directly with the authorities in the locality in order to avert an ecological catastrophe.” (Perovic28, 2000:33)

The United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, together with the United Towns Organisation (UTO/FMCU) and World Association of Cities and Local Authorities Coordination (WACLAC) released a report in 2005 about city-to-city cooperation. The results confirm my statement that south-south cooperation is more difficult to happen. Not only the reported number of north-north and north-south cooperation are much larger than south-south, but the report also explicitly expresses that:

“Limitations of resources and problems of distance represent special challenges for such links, particularly among the Least Developed Countries. In addition, in some countries of the South, the development of

international links is not as yet recognised as a legitimate city function in local government legislation... Within some countries of the South the opportunities for interchange between city practitioners is itself a challenge. National associations of local authorities and professional bodies are weak, and resources for such networking are severely restricted, particularly in the Least Developed Countries.” (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 2001:1629)

Considering the institutional context in which they are in, the European Union, in what has been termed ‘Europe of Regions’ (for regions) and ‘EuroCities’ (for the network of cities), has an institutional framework which promotes the inter-regional cooperation through funding, accompanying and latter evaluating the project. It does have, therefore, this intervening institution, guarantying the cooperative behavior of the participants. Of course, those cooperation are not restricted to security issues only, but also and principally to economic cooperation. For a more in-deep study on the European Framework for interregional framework please read Kepa Sodupe30.

One interesting aspect is that other regions may be able to benefit also from this institutional structure from the European Union. Through the URB-AL program, for example, non-central governments from Europe do decentralized cooperation31 with Latin American local governments on a wide range of different issues. The resources came from the European Union, to the European local government and into the cooperation project with the Latin American partner.

31 Decentralized cooperation refers to the financial resource meant for international cooperation – usually an ‘Oficial Development Assistance’ (ODA) resource – which is managed in a decentralized way, through local government or non-governamental organization. Japan and Canada are examples of countries which carry out operations through decentralized cooperation.
Some interesting considerations came in mind on this part. First, and quoting Cornago, “all this imposes the need to create new institutions, and new modes of the attribution of responsibility and co-decision”\(^{32}\). Second, in order to counter those new transnational threats, the efforts to reduce the gap between rich and poor in the world need to be more robust. There is interdependence on many of those new threat issues, so that cooperation must be broad in scope and participation. Nonetheless, in the current condition, undeveloped countries are not prepared to carry out collective agreements in the way it is demanded to counter those new threats. Assistance on the creation and bettering of public institutions in the third world countries is thus needed.

IV – CONCLUSION

We tried in this paper to point out some conditions and characteristics necessary for paradiplomacy to work in a ‘successful’ way, following the three proposed categorization on the place of paradiplomacy in the redefinition of international security, drafted by Noe Cornago. Some problems arise from this try-out. First, an empirical assessment of the subject (i.e., running a regression to see which independent variables will condition the success or failure of a paradiplomacy in securing peace) is not possible as not only data is unavailable but also the local governments have such different intrinsic characteristics and are in such a different context from each other that comparison becomes virtually impossible.

The methodology we followed, based on case-studies and on the review of the literature poses some problems at making generalizations, specially because, as has already been said, local governments have different characteristics and are within different context. For this reason, we tried to derive the conclusions also from more general theories of

\(^{32}\) Idem, Noe Cornago, 1999, pp. 52.
international relations and intuition. In this way, we hope to contribute with the literature on the subject providing some hypothesis to be tested empirically or confronted with other case studies. Again, what ‘works’ and ‘does not work’ is case specific and generalizations may be dangerous. It is, however, the only way to advance our knowledge on the subject and our feeling is that the generalizations made throughout this paper are quite accurate, due to the use of a comprehensive approach which encompasses a great load of reasoning, beside the empirical observation.

Secondly, we followed Cornago’s three categories on how paradiplomacy relates to international security. Inasmuch Cornago’s assessment on the subject touches the main areas, it is our feeling that two important aspects were left behind.

One of them is related to the power of the diaspora and how those can enhance the political influence and mobilize resources in favor of the local governments. Naturally, this is most strong when the local government displays a strong ethnic identity, forming a nation within a nation-state. The natural examples that come to mind, apart from the Jewish diaspora, are those from the tamils (India and Sri Lanka), the Irish diaspora and the basques. In all of those cases, a strong immigrant community outside their home countries influence the outcome of the local politics in what relates to its independence claims by lobbying, advocating and remitting resources back ‘home’. Having that in mind, there is evidence that some local governments are carrying out specific policies aimed at their diaspora. For a case-study of the Basque Autonomous Community arguing in the same line, please refer to Egurola.

“Today’s Basque diaspora includes nearly two hundred Basque communities in twenty-two countries around the world. This article addresses the political culture and institutional relations between regional governments and their ethnic diasporas. Quantitative and qualitative data highlight the Basque Autonomous Community regional government’s laws, programs, subsidies, and voting rights granted to their diaspora community institutions and individuals. I argue that non-central
government actors are flexing their formidable capacity to direct their own mutually beneficial transnational relations” (Egurrola, 2005)

A second aspect is that of the direct involvement of local governments at advocating and lobbying in favor of peace. Although we will not evaluate the impact of such kind of policy, we can make a case that there is enough evidence out there to suggest that this kind of paradiplomatic action is taking place. Following the outbreak of the Iraq war, a group of cities in the United States created a network called “cities for peace”, lobbying, passing resolutions and pressuring in favor of ending the war, although according to the USA’s constitution, this is a competence from the central government.

“Cities for Peace will work as a hub of communication among cities taking action on this issue, and help all these cities express their opinion as a bloc of people that they represent, rather than as isolated cities.”

A similar local government’s network but with broader objectives and global objectives, is the “Mayors for Peace”, composed of 1,201 cities around the world.

Other examples of direct involvement by local government advocating peace are those of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For obvious reasons, they both advocate for the complete ban on nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare. Nagasaki, for example, established a Nagasaki Citizens’ Peace Charter, a Peace Day, an Atomic Bomb Museum and many programs aiming at educating and raising awareness related to the atomic bomb. Hiroshima, by its turn, also established similar programs, activities and

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36Nagasaki City Hall http://www1.city.nagasaki.nagasaki.jp/abm/abm_e/jigyyou/jigyounmain.html

memorials to advocate for the disarmament cause. Besides, both mayor sends protests against nuclear testings and participate in the National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities.

“The National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities was established in 1989 based on the idea that it is the local authorities' responsibility to protect their citizens' lives and livelihood. The purpose of the Council is to promote the abolition of nuclear weapons by all the local and national governments of the world, and to establish a cooperative body of local authorities that have proclaimed themselves nuclear free. As of September 10, 2002, 2,653 local authorities (i.e., local governments) have proclaimed themselves nuclear free, and 319 of these have joined the Council.”

Those kinds of direct involvement of local governments, either by their own or clustered in a network, have also to be analyzed and evaluated according to their efficacy at fulfilling its objectives. They do represent, however, another kind of paradiplomatic activity geared towards peace that did escape from Cornago’s attention.

In closing, this trend of sub-national governments participating in international security affairs is related to the empowerment of local actors and multi-track conflict prevention. It is a nice and challenging research frontier waiting to be explored further by the academia.

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38 Nagasaki City Hall
V – REFERENCES

AIESEC – History


Cities for Peace


Hiroshima City Hall

IAESTE – Association for the Exchange of Students for Technical Experience – History
http://www.iaeste.org/about/history.html (accessed 05 January, 2006)


Mayors for Peace

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Rotary International – History

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